Will leaders vote for ‘No-New Revenue tax rate’ or lower amidst growth?Medina County Property appraisals have increased by 118% in past seven years

Editorial by Kayleen Holder and KK Calame (Editor & Publisher)
It’s no secret that Medina County has experienced an enormous amount of growth in the past 15 years. In many cases, county commissioners utilized tax incentives to attract growth and developers with the vision that it would someday lift some of the tax burden off of current residents.
Over 4,500 new families have moved to Medina County in the past five years. In 2017, Medina County had 18,791 homes, and five years later in 2023 there are 23,324 homes here, according to reports.
The county has also seen substantial commercial and industrial growth with facilities like Microsoft and the quarries.
As a result of the growth, county revenues have risen considerably.
In fact, county revenues have more than doubled from approximately $30 million in 2017-18 to over $66 million in the 2022-23 budget.
With this steady growth in the county’s revenue, many residents are asking leaders when the healthy growth we’ve experienced is going to lift some of the burden off of homeowners who reside here?
Medina County recieved a record number of protests from residents after tax bills arrived, around 4,500 protests this year which is 500 more than last year according to the appraisal district (and last year was also a record year for tax protests).
While home values have increased, and appraisals must be accurate, Medina County Commissioners have control over the TAX RATE used to calculate our tax bills.
Current Commissioners are: Larry Sittre, David Lynch, Tim Neuman, and newly elected Danny Lawler. The court is led by newly elected Judge Keith Lutz.
The Medina County Comissioner’s Court sets the tax rate each Septemeber. Budget meetings are already in progress.
Both appraisals and TAX RATE affects tax bills
There has been a 118% increase in appraised values in Medina County from 2017 to 2023, according to projected appraisals from the Medina County Appraisal office. 
The 2023 appraisals and protests have not been finalized yet.
“The increase is due to new industrial properties, new developments, and the overall market in general,” Johnette Dixon notes.
Many new high-end homes have moved into our county in the past 15 years, driving up comps and appraisals. In a previous interview, Dixon explained “We have to appraise properties at what it would sell for based on what similar properties have sold for.”
Example, if an acre of land sells for $50,000, that raises the appraisal value of acreage in that area significantly. And if aappraisals aren’t done correctly, it could jeopardize school district funding.
The county has lowered the tax rate some within the past seven years……but commissioners have never voted to lower the Medina County tax rate to the “effective tax rate or No-New Revenue Rate” (within the past 7 years).
The effective tax rate (or No New Revenue rate) is the rate needed for the county to generate the same amount of income as the previous year (effectively not increasing property tax bills overall even when appraisals increase).
MORE STATS
Total appraised values in Medina County :
2017 – $2,857,428,102
2018 – $3,007,626,516
2019 – $3,476,214,251
2020 – $3,832,984,245
2021 – $4,374,084,631
2022 – $5,232,813,305
2023 – $6,254,349,224 (PROJECTED, NOT FINAL)
 Home Values
In the past seven years, the average value of homes here in Medina County have increased by 113%.
The average home values for Medina County have increased as follows:
 2017 – $138,052
2019 – $155,957
2020 – $169,092
2021 – $200,347
2022 – $253,805
2023 – $295,180
 

Medina County Property appraisals have increased by 118% in past seven years
There has been a 118% increase in appraised values in Medina County from 2017 to 2023, according to projected appraisals from the Medina County Appraisal office. 
The 2023 appraisals and protests have not been finalized yet.
“The increase is due to new industrial properties, new developments, and the overall market in general,” Johnette Dixon notes.
Many new high-end homes have moved into our county in the past 15 years, adding to the issue of increased appraisals. In a previous interview, Dixon explained “We have to appraise properties at what it would sell for based on what similar properties have sold for.”
If appraisals aren’t done correctly, it could jeopardize school district funding.
Yet many in the community have expressed great concern as rising tax bills arrived.
The other thing affecting the property tax bills is the county’s tax rate, which is set by Medina County Commissioner’s Court each year in September.
Current Commissioners are: Larry Sittre, David Lynch, Tim Neuman, and newly elected Danny Lawler.
The county has lowered the tax rate some within this time frame, but commissioners have never voted to lower Medina County to the “effective tax rate or No-New Revenue Rate” (within the past 7 years). This is something that former Commissioner Jerry Beck pushed for, but was all alone when it was put to a vote.
The effective tax rate (or No New Revenue rate) is the rate needed for the county to generate the same amount of income as the previous year (effectively not increasing property tax bills even when appraisals increase).

Total appraised values in Medina County :
2017 – $2,857,428,102
2018 – $3,007,626,516
2019 – $3,476,214,251
2020 – $3,832,984,245
2021 – $4,374,084,631
2022 – $5,232,813,305
2023 – $6,254,349,224 (PROJECTED, NOT FINAL)

 Home Values
In the past seven years, the average value of homes here in Medina County have increased by 113%.
The average home values for Medina County have increased as follows:
 2017 – $138,052
2019 – $155,957
2020 – $169,092
2021 – $200,347
2022 – $253,805
2023 – $295,180
 

New internet company will use water tower; food trucks, airport hangar value draws debate

By Anton Riecher
The Devine City Council voted unanimously on June 20th to allow SAGO Internet to place an antenna on the Devine Ingram water town near the golf course. The motion by Ritchey, seconded by Vega, calls for a $200 a month charge during the four-year contract.
Company owner Rodney Hitzfelder told the council that SAGO is a three-year old Internet service provider that benefited from a $700,000 grant issued through the county to expand available local Internet to national standards.
“Since then we’ve gotten eight towers up,” he said. “We’re growing very rapidly. A lot of our requests are in Devine, Natalia and Lytle.”
In the Devine area, SAGO already operates a monopole tower on Rossville Road, he said. However, because the system he offers requires line-of-sight between the tower and the client “we found a bit of an issue getting from our 100-foot tower to the other side of town.”
Hitzfelder assured the council that the five gigahertz (5G) bandwidth used by the new water tower antenna will not interfere with police communications or other remote equipment used to monitor the water level in the tower.
Short of a direct lightning strike, the SAGO antenna will not require continuing maintenance, he said. The company does not require routine access to the water tower.
“We don’t generally go to these sites once we get them up and running unless there is some type of issue,” Hitzfelder said.
In other matters, the council did take action to end paid quarantine leave for Devine employees contracting COVID. However, that action was with the exception of law enforcement personnel still under the protection of state law.
The motion by Ritchey was seconded by District 3 Council Member Stacy Pyron and adopted unanimously.
New action was taken on filling the long vacant city administrator position currently occupied by interim city administrator Dora Rodriguez. Following a closed executive session, the council voted unanimously to schedule appointments with city administrator applicants.
Ritchey, who made the motion, said that multiple applications for the opening have been received to date.
Council renews Airport mowing contract $19,200 a year on split vote

By Anton Riecher
The council also approved a contract with Joe Munoz, owner of M C Aircraft Refinishers, for mowing at the Devine Municipal Airport. Councilman Josh Ritchey was the lone opponent to renewing the annual contract which increased to $19,200 per year.
Munoz testified that the 65-acre airport sometimes requires mowing as often as five or six times a month. Of his seven employees, one is dedicated almost full time to mowing.
A monthly $100 increase requested by Munoz is to cover additional area to mow behind Hangar 10. Munoz provides his own equipment, fuel and chemicals for the airport lawn care.
Councilman Josh Ritchey asked if the contract, in place since 2018, had ever been put out for bids to guarantee a competitive rate.
Ritchey made a motion to go out for bids on mowing, but it died for lack of a second.
Debbie Randall made the motion to continue with Munoz, stating that the constant attention required by the airport grass made it impossible for city public works to keep up with, with support from Rufino Vega, Stacy Pyron, and Michael Hernandez with Ritchey voting against the action. Instead Ritchey had suggested amending the agreement to paying for each time mowed.
With regard to Munoz’ previous request in May to lease the 17,500 square-foot Hangar 10 for his business at a monthly rate of between $1,000 and $1,500 Airport Advisory Board chairman Hap Squires suggested to the council that the Texas Department of Transportation be consulted.
“What we are hoping for from them is a look at the whole airport and how best do we utilize it now that the city owns the majority of the hangars,” Squires said.
A meeting with TxDOT’s aviation division is scheduled for July 12, he said.
Mayor Cook made a presentation based on further discussion with the airport advisory board. In a sale finalized March 9 the city purchased Hangar 10, the largest hangar at the airport, for $609,000. By comparison, the purchase of hangars 8 and 8A amounted to only $165,000.
Based on the appraisal that established the sale price, Hangar 10 should be leased at 40 cents per square foot for a return of approximately $7,000 a month to the city, Cook said.
“We have a pretty large investment there and we need to proceed accordingly to get the best return possible for our investment,” Cook said.
He said it might take another month to arrive at a decision on the Munoz offer. No action on the mattter was taken at the council meeting.
Food truck debate
Renewed effort to suspend an ordinance more closely regulating food trucks and other mobile food units in favor of existing state and county statutes proved unsuccessful during the June 20 regular session of the Devine City Council.
A motion by District 4 Council Member Josh Ritchey to repeal the city’s ordinance regulating these food vendors failed for lack of a second.
“I don’t like diverting resources to this when there are two other government agencies that do this,” Ritchey said.
Filling in the background, Mayor Butch Cook said the controversy revolved around a business who has objected to the city requiring him to obtain a permit to sell from a mobile food unit.
Ritchey said the recently enacted city ordinance managed to put city staff “in a tough spot.”
“Now we are essentially requiring extra certifications for our folks to go check ‘Is this safe?’” Ritchey said. “Did we make it clear enough that the state already has requirements? If we didn’t have this ordinance we could simply refer to the state and say ‘Hey, please enforce your policy.’”
District 5 Council Member Debbie Randall countered that all the city ordinance requires is for the vendor to show copies of their state or county health certificates.
“We don’t ask for anything additional to the state or county requirements but we need to see it and make sure it’s good to go,” Randall said. “Otherwise, Mr. Policeman will go and tell them to shut down.”
Interim City Administrator Dora Rodriguez reported that the city currently has nine permits for mobile food units issued. Cook stated that the fee is $10 a day or $50 for a year.
“So it’s a very reasonable fee,” he said.
Jerry Stevens, owner of Charlie’s Daughter restaurant, said the city ordinance provides accountability for people doing business in Devine.
Local restaurants are required to obtain “certain permits, licenses, the things we have to have to be able to run a business and sell to the public,” Stevens said.
“If you have a vendor that comes in that may or may not have the proper permits I would be concerned about what they are selling out of their trailer,” he said. “Maybe it isn’t up to the standard it should be.”
Stevens said that he would support the need for the ordinance even if he did not have food business of his own.
Cook also said the city ordinance is important with regard to sales tax enforcement.
“Without a permit no one would know if they are charging the required tax,” he said.

Report details horrific head-on train collision,de-railment, and explosion in Devine 26 years ago

On the night of June 22, 1997 at 10:52 pm, Union Pacific Railroad (UP) freight trains 5981 North and 9186 South collided head-on in Devine, Texas on the railroad bridge over Highway 132 derailing cars into the highway below. The devastating collision left a pile of wreckage with approximately 20 railcars stacked up below the bridge, four fatalities, and two injured.
The accident happened 26 years ago, but is remembered by most everyone in Devine and the surrounding towns as the explosion was seen from many, many miles away, and homes were evacuated in case toxic chemicals were aboard, which fortunately were not.
The trains were operating on a single main track with passing sidings in dark (nonsignalized) territory in which train movement was governed by conditional track warrant control authority through a dispatcher.
The conductor from 5981 North, the engineer from 9186 South, and two unidentified individuals who may have been riding on the northbound train were killed in the derailment and subsequent fire. The engineer from 5981 North received minor injuries, and the conductor from 9186 South was seriously burned.
Estimated damages exceeded $6 million.
Investigation Details
What Happened
At 10:52 p.m. on June 22, 1997, Union Pacific Railroad (UP) freight trains 5981 North and 9186 South collided head-on in Devine, Texas.
The following is a Railroad Accident Report was issued on May10,1998 following the investigation of the June 22, 1997 head on collision and derailment of the two Union Pacific Freight Trains in Devine. Source: National Transportation Safety Board
RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT Adopted: May 19, 1998 Notation 6889A
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, DC 20594 RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT COLLISION AND DERAILMENT OF UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD FREIGHT TRAINS 5981 NORTH AND 9186 SOUTH IN DEVINE, TEXAS ON JUNE 22, 1997
Abstract: On June 22, 1997, Union Pacific Railroad (UP) freight trains 5981 North and 9186 South collided head-on in Devine, Texas. The conductor from 5981 North, the engineer from 9186 South, and two unidentified individuals who may have been riding on 5981 North were killed. The engineer from 5981 North received minor injuries, and the conductor from 9186 South was seriously burned. The major safety issues discussed in this report are the train dispatcher’s performance and workload, the adequacy of management oversight of the dispatcher apprentice program and dispatching operations, the sufficiency of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) oversight of dispatching operations, the effectiveness of conditional track warrant control authority, the adequacy of disaster preparedness, the crashworthiness of locomotives and event recorders, and the merits of positive train separation control systems. As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board issued safety recommendations to the UP, the FRA, and the Texas Railroad Commission. In addition, the Safety Board reiterated a safety recommendation to the FRA.
Executive Summary: At 10:52 p.m. on June 22, 1997, Union Pacific Railroad (UP) freight trains 5981 North and 9186 South collided head-on in Devine, Texas. The trains were operating on a single main track with passing sidings in dark (nonsignalized) territory in which train movement was governed by conditional track warrant control authority through a dispatcher. The conductor from 5981 North, the engineer from 9186 South, and two unidentified individuals who may have been riding on 5981 North were killed in the derailment and subsequent fire. The engineer from 5981 North received minor injuries, and the conductor from 9186 South was seriously burned. Estimated damages exceeded $6 million. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the third-shift dispatcher to communicate the correct track warrant information to the traincrew and to verify the accuracy of the read-back information because the UP management had not established and implemented workload policies and operational procedures to ensure a safe dispatching system and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) had failed to provide standards and oversight in all aspects of train dispatching operations. Contributing to the accident was the lack of an installed positive train separation control system that would have prevented the trains from colliding by automatically intervening in their operation because of inappropriate actions being taken. The major safety issues discussed in this report are the train dispatcher’s performance and workload, the adequacy of the UP management oversight of the dispatcher apprentice program and dispatching operations, the sufficiency of the FRA oversight of dispatching operations, the effectiveness of conditional track warrant control authority, the adequacy of disaster preparedness, the crashworthiness of locomotives and event recorders, and the merits of positive train separation control systems. As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board makes recommendations to the UP, the FRA, and the Texas Railroad Commission. In addition, the Safety Board reiterates a safety recommendation to the FRA.
Investigation:
Accident Narrative: About 10:52 p.m. on June 22, 1997, Union Pacific Railroad (UP) freight trains 5981 North and 9186 South1 collided head-on in dark (nonsignalized) territory at milepost (MP) 290.4 in Devine, Texas.2 The collision occurred on a single main track at the north end of a concrete ballast deck bridge. (See figure 1.) Five locomotive units and 20 freight cars derailed, and a fire ensued. The engineer from 9186 South, the conductor from 5981 North, and two unidentified individuals received fatal injuries. The conductor from 9186 South sustained serious injuries, and the engineer from 5981 North received minor injuries.
Earlier that day at 2:30 p.m., train 5981 North had departed Laredo. (See figure 2.) Train 5981 North was given authorization by track warrant3 from the second-shift train dispatcher4 to proceed to Callaghan (MP 385.3), the first station after Laredo. (See figure 3 for blank standard UP track warrant form.) At Callaghan, the 5981 North met a southbound train and was authorized by the dispatcher to proceed to Gardendale (MP 339.5), where it was stopped and met another southbound train. While 5981 North was stopped, the U.S. Border Patrol apprehended two suspected illegal immigrants who were riding the train. Leaving Gardendale about 6:45 p.m., train 5981 North proceeded to the side track at Derby (MP 321.5), where eight ballast cars were added to the train. The engineer said that after these cars were added and the proper air test was performed, the train proceeded to and entered the siding at Melon (MP 318.0).

footnotes:
1 The UP designated them as freight trains MLDLI and ZYCMX, respectively.
2 All train movements and locations are within Texas except where specified otherwise. 3 A track warrant is given via radio by or through proper railroad personnel to govern train movements. The Federal Railroad Administration interprets track warrants as train orders by radio. Until 1985, train orders were written instructions to govern the movements of a train issued by the train dispatcher through the telephone to online train order operators, who in turn typed these instructions for delivery to the traincrews of passing trains. These instructions involved the transmitting, typing, and repeating of their contents. In 1985, the train order method for train movements was discontinued and replaced by the track warrant system on most railroads. 4 Dispatchers for the Austin subdivision work either a first (6:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.), second (2:30 to 10:30 p.m.), or third (10:30 p.m. to 6:30 a.m.) shift at the UP Harriman Dispatch Center in Omaha, Nebraska.
5 Generated from the train dispatcher’s work station computer, as displayed on the screen when the instructions were radio-issued to the crew.
6 Opened in 1989, the dispatch center houses the entire UP main track operations system and the dispatchers who oversee train operations.
7 Supports the track warrant system that is unique to the UP.
9 Maintained to accommodate passenger and freight trains at maximum allowable speeds of 80 and 60 mph, respectively.
10 Track bulletins are addressed to trains that operate through the dispatcher’s assigned territories and contain temporary speed restrictions, locations of personnel and equipment working, and possible safety hazards.
11 Although authority for the train movement has been issued, a specific condition must be met before the authority is acted on.
14 The postmortem production of alcohol can occur during the decomposition process with no prior alcohol consumption.
16Pulse Electronics, Incorporated, Rockville, Maryland.
17The railroad recording time was not synchronized with the time of the police report.

At that time, the engineer of train 5981 North requested automobile transportation and was driven to a nearby store to purchase food. The conductor remained with train 5981 North. As the engineer was returning to the train, he overheard an exchange on a railroad radio installed in the car; in this exchange, the dispatcher authorized the second of the two trains being met at Melon to proceed farther south beyond Melon. The engineer stated that after he boarded the locomotive, the conductor received the track warrant authorization from the second-shift train dispatcher at 9:18 p.m. instructing the train to depart Melon and proceed to Gessner (MP 278.5), where 5981 North would be required to take (enter) the siding.
At 10:30 p.m., the third-shift train dispatcher issued a track warrant instructing 5981 North to proceed from Gessner to San Antonio after meeting 9186 South at Gessner. Train 5981 North was instructed to enter the siding at Gessner so that 9186 South could pass on the main track. At Devine, the 5981 North crew noted a bright glow on the horizon, and both the engineer and the conductor rose from their respective seats trying to identify this glow. At that moment, the headlight of an oncoming locomotive came into view. The engineer of 5981 North said he placed the train into emergency braking, exited the rear door of the control compartment, and jumped from the locomotive. The conductor exited the forward door of the control compartment and either jumped or was thrown from the locomotive.
Earlier at 9:56 p.m. on June 22, 1997, train 9186 South had been authorized by track warrant 8261 from the second-shift train dispatcher to proceed to Gessner, departing San Antonio about 10:10 p.m. The train was authorized by track warrant 8289 (see figure 4) from the third-shift dispatcher at 10:28 p.m. to proceed from Gessner to Melon. Train 9186 South passed the Gessner siding and entered the city of Devine. At some point, the crew saw the oncoming northbound train, and both the engineer and the conductor jumped from the lead locomotive as the trains collided.
The printed copy5 of track warrant 8289 (see figure 4) contained four elements: (box 2) Proceed from Gessner to Melon on main track, (box 7) Not in effect until after arrival of 5981 North at Gessner, (box 8) Hold the main track at last named point [Melon], and (box 15) Flag protection not required against following trains on the same track. According to the voice recordings between the 9186 South crew and the third-shift train dispatcher, the instructions contained three elements: (box 2) Proceed from Gessner to Melon on main track, (box 8) Hold the main track at last named point, and (box 15) Flag protection not required against following trains on the same track. In the voice recordings, 9186 South was authorized to proceed from Gessner to Melon (box 2); absent from the voice recordings was “not in effect until after arrival of 5981 North at Gessner” (box 7).
The third-shift (relieving) dispatcher reported that during the shift changeover between 10:15 and 10:20 p.m., he discussed with the second-shift (departing) dispatcher how many trains were operating and their status. The majority of the UP trains on the Austin subdivision at that time were on the San Antonio to Laredo territory, and a National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) train was operating from Temple to Taylor. The third-shift dispatcher stated that several radio calls were coming in and “it was busy,” which was “probably an average night for that position.” His first radio conversation was at 10:20:37 p.m. with the Amtrak traincrew. During this conversation, the third-shift dispatcher cleared and voided the track bulletin item that had been previously issued to the Amtrak train. The conversation ended at 10:21:50 p.m. The next radio communication was initiated at 10:24:10 p.m. by the traincrew of UP IYCLD, which was operating on the Austin subdivision. The traincrew “gave up” its track warrant to the dispatcher, who then created a new track warrant directing the train to proceed from Gardendale on the main track of the Austin subdivision. This conversation ended at 10:26:03 p.m.
At 10:26:05 p.m., the dispatcher called train 9186 South, and the conductor responded immediately. The dispatcher said, “Yeah, let me get you an ‘after-arrival’ there at Gessner while I have a minute, over.” The conductor responded, “All right, ready.” When communicating track warrant instructions to a traincrew, dispatchers are required to read the information, as it is presented on the screen, and to verify the accuracy of the information, comparing the oral read-back from the traincrew with the information shown on the screen. The third-shift dispatcher then transmitted the track warrant information to 9186 South, omitting the instruction “not in effect until after arrival of 5981 North at Gessner” (the box 7 instruction on the track warrant). The third-shift dispatcher later said that he could not recall whether he had included the box 7 instruction (to remain at Gessner) on the track warrant when formally transmitting authorization to 9186 South by voice. The recorded radio transcripts of the transmission of this track warrant between the dispatcher and the 9186 South traincrew did not include this instruction. The conductor repeated the information to the dispatcher, and the dispatcher okayed the read-back information despite the omission of the box 7 instruction that was on the computer screen display. Their conversation ended at 10:28:10 p.m. Four seconds later, the dispatcher called train 5981 North and accurately relayed the track warrant (8290) information for that train to its conductor. Their conversation ended at 10:30:04 p.m. (See appendix A for transcript of track warrants 8289 and 8290.)
See the Operations Information section for more information about UP dispatching techniques.
Railroad Damage
Two locomotive units and 14 cars were derailed from train 9186 South; both locomotive units and 2 cars were destroyed. Three locomotive units and six cars were derailed from train 5981 North; one locomotive unit and five cars were destroyed.
The estimated costs were:
Locomotives $ 4,150,000
Cars 501,300
Track 40,000
Structures 900,000
Lading 320,000
Clearing 103,767
Total $ 6,015,067

Personnel Information
Third Shift Dispatcher — The 39-year-old train dispatcher began working for UP as a section man in 1975, and he transferred in 1979 to the signal department, where he worked as the systems signal man in Salt Lake City, Utah. He became a signal maintainer in Caliente, Nevada, in April 1990; an electronics technician at the Harriman Dispatch Center (HDC)6 in February 1994; and then an apprentice train dispatcher in May 1996.
According to the third-shift dispatcher, his training began at the HDC with a 3-week class in the railroad operating rules, including the dispatching and air brake rules. He stated that because he had replaced a trainee who had dropped out, his training had been shorter than that of other dispatchers and he had missed the basic railroading review, which was primarily designed for apprentice train dispatchers lacking a background in railroading. He then had 1 month of training in dispatcher duties using a simulator to become familiar with the computeraided dispatching (CAD) system.7 In July, he started 1-month on-the-job training (OJT), during which he observed an experienced dispatcher operate the line and later operated the line while being observed by the OJT dispatcher trainer. Afterwards, as part of the qualifying period, the manager of train dispatchers observed him as a trainee performing dispatch duties during a shift. He became a qualified dispatcher on August 17, 1996, and since then had worked on the Austin subdivision. Before June 22, 1997, he had not been cited for any dispatching rules violations.
After the Devine accident, the third-shift dispatcher stated that he believed that he had been adequately trained to operate as a dispatcher. He added that the simulator and OJT were not equal to handling the dispatching demands and said, “How can training be equal to . . . a dozen radios going off and 10 people yelling at you at the same time. . . . I guess the main thing that would be missing from all of that would be really interaction with somebody out in the field . . . especially when you’re new. . . . Having to deal with that sort of thing is hard.”
The third-shift dispatcher reported that he was in good health, and, according to his medical records, he had normal vision, with no color-vision problems, and normal hearing. His last UP physical was in 1989. He reported that he was not taking any prescription or over-thecounter medications at the time of the accident. He stated that he did not smoke tobacco or drink alcohol.
The third-shift dispatcher had not worked on Friday, June 20, 1997. On Saturday, June 21, he woke about 9 a.m., remained at home performing chores, left for work about 9:40 p.m., and arrived there at 10:15 p.m. He started his shift about 10:20 p.m. and worked until 6:20 a.m. on Sunday, June 22. After returning home, he retired at 7 a.m. and slept until about 12:30 p.m. He remained at home during the day, left for work about 9:40 p.m., arrived about 10:15 p.m., and started his shift.
5981 North Traincrew — The UP records indicated that the crew of train 5981 North met the requirements as prescribed in the Hours-ofService Act.
The 27-year-old engineer was hired in July 1989 by the UP as a trainman at San Antonio. In June 1993, he transferred to engine service and worked as a fireman while participating in the training program to become a locomotive engineer. In December 1993, he was promoted to locomotive engineer. He had passed his most recent physical examination in March 1995. His vision and hearing were normal. He reported being well-rested before the accident. The engineer had worked the previous 3 days before the accident. He was a certified locomotive engineer under the regulations found in 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 240, was current on the UP operating rules, and had passed his last rules examination in January 1995.
The 48-year-old conductor was hired in May 1973 by the UP as a trainman at San Antonio. In May 1975, he was promoted to conductor. He passed his last physical examination in May 1996. According to the guidelines established by UP, the conductor was qualified to perform the duties of a conductor on the Austin subdivision. He was current on the UP operating rules and had passed his last rules examination in April 1995. The conductor had worked the previous 2 days before the accident.
9186 South Traincrew — The UP records indicated that the crew of train 9186 South met the requirements as prescribed in the Hours-of Service Act.
The 39-year-old engineer was hired in August 1976 by the UP as a laborer at San Marcos. In May 1985, he transferred to a clerical position; moving to Omaha in July 1989, he worked in a crew dispatching position. He transferred to San Antonio in May 1993 as a trainman and in October 1994 was promoted to conductor. In March 1995, he transferred to the position of student engineer to learn the craft of locomotive engineer; on May 12, 1995, he was promoted to locomotive engineer. He passed his last physical examination on September 12, 1996. According to the UP guidelines, the engineer was qualified to perform the duties of a locomotive engineer on the Austin subdivision. He was a certified locomotive engineer under the regulations found in 49 CFR Part 240, was current on the UP operating rules, and had passed his last rules examination on June 10, 1997. The engineer had worked the previous 2 days before the accident.
The 37-year-old conductor was hired in June 1996 by the UP as a brakeman at San Antonio. Within 3 weeks, he received formal training, with examinations, that would later qualify him as a conductor. In February 1997, he was qualified as and promoted to conductor; during the previous 6 months, he had worked primarily in yard service. In April 1997, he was assigned to work as a freight conductor. For the 60 days before the collision at Devine, he worked as a freight conductor, alternating his duty cycles with yard service positions. He passed his last physical examination in December 1996. According to the UP guidelines, the conductor was qualified to perform the duties of a conductor on the Austin subdivision. He was current on the UP operating rules and had passed his last rules examination on June 27, 1996. The conductor had worked the previous 2 days before the accident.
Train Information
Train 5981 North — The train consisted of locomotive units UP5981 (a 3,800-horsepower EMD8 SD60), UP4211 (a 3,000-horsepower EMD SD-40-2), and UP5084 (a 3,500- horsepower EMD SD50M) and 83 loaded and 11 empty freight cars. On June 22, 1997, at 7,200 feet long and drafting 8,200 tons, train 5981 North originated at Laredo, where it was inspected at 12:20 p.m. An initial terminal air brake test was successfully completed at 2:20 p.m., and the train departed at 3 p.m. Eight loaded ballast cars were added at Derby. Train 9186 South — The train consisted of locomotive units UP9186 (a 4,000-horsepower General Electric C40-8) and UP6143 (a 3,800- horsepower EMD SD60-M) and 62 loaded freight cars. At 4,071 feet long and drafting 3,284 tons, train 9186 South originated at the UP Yard Center near Chicago, Illinois, on June 21, 1997. Two carmen inspected the train and then assisted in performing a successful initial terminal air brake test, and the train departed at 6:03 a.m. On June 22 at 2:40 a.m., the train was given an intermediate (1,000-mile) air brake test at Texarkana. The air brake test was successfully completed, and 9186 South departed at 4:09 a.m.
Train 9186 South arrived at 8:48 p.m. at San Antonio, where it was to receive another air brake test. The outbound traincrew reported that the radio was defective on the lead locomotive unit, and the radio was subsequently replaced. The air brake test was successfully completed by the traincrew, and 9186 South departed at 10:10 p.m.
Postcollision Train Information
The three-unit locomotive consist of train 5981 North remained on the bridge, but the twounit locomotive consist of train 9186 South toppled from the bridge onto the road below. A 8 Electro-Motive Division of General Motors. number of trailing freight cars in each train piled up on and around the locomotive wreckage on the bridge and in the street below. Diesel fuel spilled, and a fire ensued, extensively damaging most of the equipment in the immediate proximity of the overpass. (See figure 5.)
Train 5981 North — The lead locomotive unit UP5981 exhibited massive catastrophic structural damage; the short-hood structure, cab assembly, and electrical cabinet were effectively sheared off horizontally at the top of the frame assembly deck plate surface. The diesel engine was found to have been displaced aft about 8 feet, and the main generator had separated from the engine. The frame had bowed downward, displaying a bend estimated at 1 foot. The remaining car body (sheet metal) was heavily deformed, and the entire unit had been consumed by the fire.
The trailing locomotive unit UP4211 also exhibited massive damage; the cab assembly and electrical cabinet were found to be sheared off level with the top deck of the short-hood structure, which remained relatively structurally undamaged. The car body (sheet metal) and internal machinery on the aft-end of the unit were compressed in a forward direction, having been contacted by the third locomotive in the consist, which overrode this unit. Approximately one-third of the front of the unit exhibited fire damage.
The trailing locomotive unit UP5084 overrode the aft-end of the succeeding unit and came to rest with its lead-end resting on top of the frame of the locomotive in the number two position. The leading truck assembly had detached from its mounting and was wedged between the two locomotive structures. The trailing truck remained attached. The fuel tank was detached from its normal mounting position and came to rest on the ballast beneath the unit. The locomotive, which exhibited fire damage on its exterior surfaces, was the least damaged of the units involved.
Train 9186 South — The lead locomotive unit UP9186 traveled down the northwest embankment slope and landed upright on the road, approximately parallel to the bridge, with the aft-end of the unit resting on the northwest embankment slope. The unit lost its front truck assembly, exhibited inward deformation to its front pilot plate and short-hood structure, and was consumed by the fire. The cab structure remained intact and was not crushed by the impact.
The trailing locomotive unit UP6143 fell toward the pavement on the east side of the bridge, landed cab-end down, and oriented slightly on its right side on top of derailed freight car wreckage, with the aft-end raised up and the left side resting on wreckage that remained on the bridge. The front truck assembly had separated, and the fuel tank showed massive deformation damage. The front pilot plate and short-hood structure were substantially deformed inward; the cab remained structurally intact. The remainder of the unit exhibited extensive car body panel (sheet metal) deformation, and the entire unit was consumed by the fire.
Track and Signal Information
The track in the area of the collision was constructed with 112-pound rail, which was manufactured and laid in 1943, and later restructured into continuous-welded-rail. The rail rested in double shoulder tie-plates secured to 9-foot timber cross ties with 5/8- by 6-inch cut track spikes. The ties were supported in 2- inch crushed rock ballast and maintained with 12-inch shoulders to restrain lateral movement. Longitudinal movement was restricted with channel lock rail anchors base-applied to every cross tie in a box pattern.
The southbound alignment for the undulating track was tangent at the point of impact (POI). Train 9186 South negotiated a 1° 23′ left-hand curve at MP 289.5, ascended a 0.51-percent grade before cresting the hill at MP 290, and was descending the 0.82-percent grade leading to the POI. At MP 290.4, 5981 North negotiated the 3° 11′ right-hand curve at MP 293 before entering the long tangent approach to the POI.
The track is maintained to meet or exceed the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) standards for a class 4 track.9 The UP track personnel inspect the track 7 days a week. The weekly inspection records between May 1 and June 3, 1997, indicate no FRA track defects were found. An inspection of the track was conducted on the day of the accident, and no FRA defects were discovered.
The 140-foot concrete ballast deck bridge at the POI consisted of two 30-foot approach spans and an 80-foot main span extending over the highway. The bridge had extensive damage as a result of the collision and was replaced with a similar structure on the approach spans. The main span was changed from built-up beam sections over the highway to welded beams over the highway. The concrete deck was replaced with a steel deck to hold the ballast and ties.
The accident territory did not employ a block signal system (wayside signals) to govern train movements and was called dark (nonsignalized) territory; the movement of trains was controlled by a track warrant system.
Operations Information
According to the UP, 12 or 13 trains in both directions pass through the Devine area daily. The movement of trains over the territory is governed by the UP operating rules, timetable instructions, and general orders. The operating rules were provided by the Third Edition of the General Code of Operating Rules, dated April 10, 1994. Any rule modifications or revisions to the operating rules were part of the UP Timetable No. 2, effective October 29, 1995, that included the “System Special Instructions,” which provided general revisions, and the “Service Unit San Antonio, Austin Subdivision,” which contained information specific to operating trains through the territory where this accident occurred. The permanent track speeds for the trains were designated in the timetable, and temporary speed restrictions were issued through the train dispatcher by track bulletin.10
The train movements were controlled by the train dispatcher, who issued instructions in the form of track warrants. Track warrants evolved from train orders and are not addressed in the CFR. Each train received its original movement instructions at the initial station of the train. Subsequently, the train dispatcher issued additional track warrants by radio to the traincrews at intermediate locations. The receiving crewmember was required to write down the track warrants, as received over the radio, on a standard UP form and to read them back to the train dispatcher. This method of operation allowed the train dispatcher to establish or change the meeting locations of trains and add movements on the territory.
To establish a meeting point between opposing trains, the train dispatcher issued a track warrant (see figure 3) to one train that included, at a minimum, a box 2 that stated the “proceed from” and “to” limits being granted and a box 10 that instructed “clear main track at last named point” as prescribed in box 2. The train traveling in the opposite direction was issued a track warrant that included, at a minimum, a box 2 that stated the “proceed from” and “to” limits being granted and a box 8 that instructed “hold main track at last named point” (the “to” limit granted in box 2). The train instructed to clear the main track at the station where the meet was to take place was not authorized to proceed on the main track beyond the initial switch of the siding without additional track warrant authority. The train instructed to hold the main track was not authorized to proceed beyond the switch at the end of the last named point for the “to” station until additional track warrant authority was issued. This system protected the two opposing trains, and the physical passing of the trains was accomplished.

When one train arrived at a station earlier than the other train, the dispatcher had two options for giving the first train further instructions. The dispatcher could either wait until the meet had taken place and then authorize both trains to proceed beyond this station in the opposite directions or authorize the train that had arrived at the station early to proceed to the next station but not leave that station until “after the arrival” (after-arrival) of the opposing train. The dispatcher gave movement instructions to trains, but the trains could not act on these instructions until a prescribed event occurred, such as the arrival of another train. This method (conditional track warrant control authority)11 allowed the train dispatchers to prepare the train movements in advance and pace their workloads.
All track warrants that were issued by the train dispatcher were created on a computer screen using the CAD system. The dispatcher requested a track warrant by entering the train’s ID (mainframe computer symbol) and the subdivision on the computer screen menu. The CAD system then generated a track warrant screen displaying a box 1 (to void a previously issued track warrant), a box 2 (to establish directional authority limits), and a box 4 (to establish “work between” or nondirectional limits). Should the train dispatcher choose to establish directional authority, the dispatcher would place an “x” in box 2 and type the “proceed from” and “to” locations (specifying the limits the train was being granted). (See figure 3 for the blank UP track warrant form.) Trains were authorized from station to station, moving through the territory in short segments, which gave the dispatcher flexibility in establishing a meeting location between opposing trains.
A conflict resolution logic had been developed for the CAD system to prevent two trains from receiving nonconditional authorization onto the same segment of track at the same time. For example, if a train dispatcher authorized a southbound train from station A to station B, the computer accepted this as a valid track warrant. If the train dispatcher subsequently issued a track warrant authorizing a northbound train from station B to station A, the CAD system detected the conflict, and the screen immediately displayed the required conditional authority instruction (box 7) that the northbound train not leave station B until after-arrival of the southbound train. At the same time, a third screen displayed a conflict between the two trains. After interviews with several dispatchers, the Safety Board found that dispatchers were aware that this protection was available in the system.
During an interview with the third-shift train dispatcher, he recalled mentioning to the 9186 South traincrew that he intended to issue an afterarrival authority. During the formal transmission of track warrant 8289, the dispatcher failed to orally communicate the box 7 requirement (not in effect until after the arrival of 5981 North at Gessner) even though the CAD system had generated the box 7 after-arrival instruction on the screen. When the train dispatcher was later asked how he had determined that the track warrant would be an after-arrival, he stated that he had logically come to that conclusion because of the train movements in the territory and, specifically, the conflict with the northbound train.
Meteorological Information
At 10:51 p.m., the weather station at Hondo, which is 19 nautical miles northwest of Devine, reported clear skies with 10-mile visibility, 78°- F temperature, 71°-F dew point, and 11-knot winds.
Medical, Pathological, and Toxicological Information
Third-Shift Dispatcher — Following the accident, the third-shift dispatcher was removed from service. Consistent with FRA regulations, he took a breath test and provided blood and urine specimens for postaccident alcohol and drug testing. About 2 a.m. on June 23, a breath test was administered to the dispatcher, who was then taken to a local hospital, where at 3:45 a.m., he provided blood and urine specimens, which were sent to and analyzed by Northwest Toxicology, Incorporated. The results of the urine analysis and the blood and breath test analyses were negative for drugs and for alcohol.
5981 North Traincrew — The engineer was transported to an area hospital for treatment of superficial abrasions and released the same day. His postaccident toxicological testing was negative for drugs and alcohol.
The body of the conductor of 5981 North was found adjacent to the track beneath wreckage debris. The autopsy report indicated that he had received severe chest and abdominal injuries, that he had sustained severe burn trauma, and that his right arm had been severed. The postaccident toxicological testing indicated the presence of ethyl alcohol in his blood (0.011 w/v%) and urine (0.024 w/v%). Northwest Toxicology, Incorporated, concluded, Based upon the information provided by the FRA regarding the putrefaction of the body and the low concentration of ethyl alcohol found, it cannot be determined whether the ethyl alcohol present in the blood and urine is due to antemortem consumption or postmortem production. 14
The severely burned and mangled bodies of two unidentified people, believed to have been the individuals who may have been riding on one of the 5981 North locomotive units, were found beneath wreckage debris on the pavement under the bridge near the POI.
9186 South Traincrew — The body of the 9186 South engineer was found adjacent to the track about 126 feet north of the north bridge abutment. The autopsy report indicated that he had sustained severe chest injuries and blunt force trauma to the head. His postaccident toxicological testing was negative for drugs and alcohol.
Within minutes after the collision, a firefighter found the conductor of 9186 South standing on the road on the east side of the overpass near the burning wreckage. He had sustained first and second degree burns to the face, torso, and leg, and was helicoptered to the U.S. Army Hospital in San Antonio for treatment. His postaccident toxicological testing was negative for alcohol but indicated the presence of morphine in both the urine (107,929 ng/ml) and blood (45 ng/ml). Morphine was administered to the conductor at the medical facility to which he was admitted.
Emergency Response
Shortly before 11 p.m. on June 22, 1997, a Devine Police Department (DPD) officer, on routine motor patrol near the UP track south of the railroad bridge at MP 290.4, reported that he observed a passing northbound train, heard a loud explosion sound, and noted that the passing train was rapidly decelerating. Seeing flames and black smoke at the railroad overpass in his rear view mirror, he radioed the DPD dispatch desk, which received the transmission at 10:52 p.m. and notified the Devine Volunteer Fire Department (DVFD) and the DPD with an “allhands” respond request. Numerous 911 phone calls were also received from concerned residents reporting a loud explosion sound.
While driving to the accident scene, the officer who had witnessed the event encountered the engineer of 5981 North, who had been injured after jumping from the northbound train; the engineer indicated that the other train possibly contained hazardous materials. Other police officers and an emergency medical service (EMS) ambulance and staff soon arrived at that location, which later functioned as the medical staging area for the accident. The EMS ambulance staff determined that the engineer of 5981 North did not have life-threatening injuries, and he was later transported by ambulance to a local hospital. The chief of the DVFD activated the Incident Command System and assumed control as the incident commander. A temporary command post was established on the west side of the overpass.
Because the 5981 North engineer had indicated that hazardous materials may have been on board a train, the community disaster plan was implemented, and the Devine Emergency Management Coordinator was dispatched. The Chemical Transportation Emergency Center15 was contacted about 11:06 p.m. by the DPD, which also contacted the railroad to request hazardous materials consist information. The UP responded by phone and fax that no hazardous materials products were on board either train. Because of the concern about a toxic materials release, the DVFD chief had directed an evacuation of all residences within a 1/4-mile radius of the fire. The DPD had closed roads around the fire scene to all traffic but emergency vehicles. Between 75 and 100 residents were sheltered at the local high school and were permitted to return to their residences when the UP confirmed that no 15The center, operated by the Chemical Manufacturers Association, was established to provide initial and immediate information about handling hazardous materials and other chemicals. hazardous materials products were involved in the fire.
The firefighting suppression effort continued to focus on the blaze, which reportedly flared several hundred feet high and was seen up to 30 miles away. About 1 a.m. on June 23, the fire had been substantially suppressed, and the DVFD chief directed that all water lines be shut down. About 1:37 a.m., the fire was declared under control.
Survival Aspects
Locomotive Cab Survivability — On the northbound train, the operating cab had separated from the lead unit (UP5981) and was found crushed beneath the wreckage debris. The cab had been fully consumed by fire, and no survival space remained. On the southbound train, the operating cab of the lead unit (UP9186) had not been significantly crushed during the collision, but the cab and the entire unit were fully consumed by the fire.
Fire and Rescue Services — The 29- member DVFD provides exclusive firefighting support to Devine, a rural community of about 4,000 people. Supplementary firefighting support is available through mutual aid requests to neighboring communities. The DVFD is commanded by the chief (he works professionally for and in the city of San Antonio as a trained, full-time firefighter) and is supported by three assistant chiefs. At the time of the accident, the DVFD fire suppression equipment consisted of two conventional pump trucks (750 gpm and 1000 gpm) and three small support trucks. The DVFD’s support apparatus included ladders, nozzles and hoses, lights, selfcontained breathing equipment, and a small stock of fire suppression foam.
Municipal Disaster Plan — The City of Devine has a comprehensive, documented plan (issued in 1990 and revised in August 1996), based on the State model, which is coordinated by the Emergency Management Coordinator and an assistant staffer of the Devine Emergency Management Agency. Under the plan, Devine conducts an annual simulated live-disaster exercise and a semiannual table-top drill. All the Devine municipal agencies (fire, police, emergency management, and public works) participated in the most recent simulation exercise, which occurred about 6 months before the train accident. The exercise involved a hazardous materials truck fire in a congested residential neighborhood and the hazardous materials cleanup. The most recent table-top drill occurred about 1 year before the train accident.
Locomotive Event Recorders
— On August 11, 1997, the Safety Board laboratory received the Pulse Data Pack event recorder, the Pulse Data Pack DP-400 event recorder cartridge, and the speed indicator from locomotive UP4211 of train 5981 North; the QTron event recorder, the UP event recorder download diskette, and the speed indicator from locomotive UP5084 of train 5981 North; and the burned remains of the event recorder from locomotive UP9186 of train 9186 South.
The Pulse Data Pack event recorder from locomotive UP4211 was designed to record the time, distance traveled (miles), speed (mph), traction motor current (load amps), automatic brake setting, throttle position, independent brake pressure (psi), and reverser position. These digitally encoded parameters were sampled every 5 3/4 seconds. The data were then written to the magnetic tape in two consecutive and identical records of 2 7/8 seconds in length during the 5 3/4-second period between the samples. The data from the cartridge of the Pulse Data Pack event recorder from locomotive UP4211 were found to be anomalous when read out using equipment in the Safety Board laboratory. The recorder and its magnetic tape were taken to the manufacturer16 for analysis. The manufacturer indicated that the event recorder appeared to be operating properly and the magnetic tape could be read, but no input signals concerning traction motor current or brake reduction levels could be found.
Locomotive UP5084 was equipped with a Q-Tron Datacord 5000 solid-state recording system that was designed to record the time, date, unit number, distance traveled (miles), speed (mph), traction motor current (load amps), brake pipe pressure (psi), throttle position, and brake cylinder pressure (psi). The parameter values were recorded whenever a parameter changed. The magnitude of the change necessary to trigger a parameter recording is preprogrammed into the recording system. The manufacturer of the Q-Tron recorder indicated that the maximum recording resolution of the recorder was 1/10 second, with the exception of speed, which was recorded at 1-second intervals.
The collision log report from the locomotive UP5084 Q-Tron recorder read-out at the Safety Board laboratory follows: Recorder Train Time Speed Action 10:49:44 p.m. 43.6 mph Throttle position changed from 8 to 4. Traction motor current decreased steadily from 416 to 205 amps during the following 6 seconds.
10:49:50 p.m. 42.5 mph Throttle position changed from 4 to 0 and remained at 0 thereafter. Traction motor current decreased from 205 to 99 amps about 1 second later and gradually decreased to 0 amps during the following 4 seconds.
10:49:52 p.m. 42.2 mph Brake cylinder pressure changed from 0 to 6 psi and increased to 76 psi during the following 10 seconds.
10:49:53 p.m. 41.7 mph Brake pipe pressure changed from 89 to 59 psi and decreased to 0 psi within 1 second.
10:50:23 p.m. 18.7 mph Brake cylinder pressure changed from 77 to 7 psi and decreased to 0 psi during the following 3 seconds.
10:50:25p.m. 0 mph
(17)
The type of event recorder equipment from locomotive UP4211 of train 5981 North and from locomotives UP9186 and UP6143 of train 9186 South was customarily carried in the nose section of the controlling end of the locomotive. The event recorder equipment from locomotive units UP5981 and UP5084 of train 5981 North was most likely located in the locomotive alcove either immediately on the right, attached to the sidewall, or on the left, attached to the bulkhead wall. No standards have been developed for the location of event recorder equipment.
The event recorder from locomotive UP5981 of train 5981 North was destroyed by crushing force, and the event recorders on locomotives UP9186 and UP6143 of train 9186 South were destroyed by the fire. The Safety Board is working with the FRA, class 1 railroads, railroad employee union representatives, and locomotive event recorder and locomotive manufacturers to develop and implement an FRA rule detailing specific survivability standards that locomotive event recorders must adhere to. The Safety Board has encouraged the FRA to address the survivability of event recorders in all known or anticipated accident scenarios, considering the experience with other modal standards of event recorder crashworthiness. At the time of this report, the FRA had no anticipated date of issuance for the standards.
The railroad recording time was not synchronized with the time of the police report.

Water violations for City of Devine cite “failure to test”

A public notice this week details several violations relating to Devine city water that occurred last year. Most of the violations pertain to the “failure to test” over a dozen major routine contaminants. Two other violations were regarding failure to provide notice to the community. One violation was for high levels of Ecoli discovered in the LC Martin well after the well went down in the ice storm and was disconnected from the water system.
You can find details in the public notice and in this article.
The 10 page report states that the City of Devine failed to test for the following contaminants and were in violation for a 1 year period (January 2022 through December 2022) while sampling began.
“When Isamel retired and left, there was miscommunication about what reports and sampling needed to be done. To get back in compliance, they required public works to do 40 samples which we started collecting in March of 2022,” said interim City Administrator Dora Rodriguez in an interview Tuesday.
“Everything has been coming out good since we started getting samples,” Public Works Director Pete Sanchez added. “We did have some samples with Nitrate that were a little high, but not over the limit.”
The contaminants in question were: Nitrate, Trichloroethane , Dichloroethylene, Trichlorobenzene, dichloroethane, dichloropropane, benzene, chlorobenzene, styrene, Toluene, Trichloroethylene, vinyl chloride, xylenes, ethylbenzene, chlorobenzene, carbon tetrachloride, tetrachloroethylene, dichlorobenzene, and dichloromethane.
Explanations cite that it is important to monitor these levels as they are known to cause problems with liver, kidney, nervous system, circulatory system, cancer, immune system, adrenal gland, decrease in blood platelets, and/or anemia, IF any of them were to be high. Specifically, nitrate is especially dangerous for newborn babies under the age of six months as high levels can cause serious illness or death, shortness of breath or blue baby syndrome. HOWEVER, city officials assured us that none of these contaminants showed as being over the limit in this time frame, according to Rodriguez and Sanchez.
The report states that all of the reporting issues have been resolved, except the positive Ecoli samples from the LC Martin well which was found in October of 2022.
According to Rodriguez and Sanchez, per the Ecoli violation, this LC Martin well where Ecoli was detected had been out of operation since February 202–for months before the sample was taken. After the ice storm, the well went down and they disconnected it, Rodriguez said. They were hoping to get it back online but after three positive Ecoli samples, they abandoned the hope of using the well for the time being, Sanchez stated.
“It wasn’t even connected to the water system at the time of the positive samples,” Rodriguez said.
“We take samples every month for bacteria, so we are confident that there was no Ecoli when the well was in use, and it is still disconnected at this time,” Sanchez added.
Sanchez noted that the city is also testing the asbestos level every quarter voluntarily because of the ongoing construction.
Also in the report, were two violations for failure to notify consumers of high levels of LEAD (violation April 1-4, 2022) and had a public notice violation on September 2, 2022.

Devine council votes to freeze property tax rates for over 65

By Anton Riecher
By a vote of 4-0, the Devine City Council approved an ordinance to freeze property tax rates for residents over the age of 65, mirroring previous measures taken by the county and school district.
“I couldn’t be more in favor of it personally,” Mayor Butch Cook told the audience for the June 20 regular session.
On a motion by District 4 Council Member Josh Ritchey, seconded by District 2 Council Member Michael Hernandez, the council approved the ordinance stating that no Devine property owner will pay more in city property taxes than the year of their 65th birthday.
Effective beginning the 2022 tax year, the tax relief ordinance also applies to permanently disabled citizens unable to work.
District 5 council member Debbie Randall chose to abstain from the vote.
Johnette Dixon, chief appraiser for Medina County, described how the county tax freeze works.
“Whatever they would pay in 2022, anyone who is over 65 right now would pay whatever 2022 taxes were from here on out,” Dixon said. “The rate can come down but can never go above it.”
Former District 4 County Commissioner Jerry Beck spoke in support of the action, saying it meant relief from “skyrocketing appraisals.” Devine resident Bill Montgomery also spoke in support of the ordinance.
“The city isn’t going to be out any major amount of money,” he said. “The value of my property is still going to go up.”
Mayor Cook initially wanted to table the ordinance until a draft could be prepared. However, Dixon warned that it would have to be in place before the appraisal district’s tax certification scheduled for July 20. Otherwise, the tax relief would not apply until the 2023 tax year.
City Attorney Thomas Cate recommended proceeding with a vote on the ordinance to assure making the deadline.
Dixon earlier addressed the council regarding the proposed 2024 budget for the Medina County Appraisal District approved by its board of directors.
“Our 2024 preliminary budget proposal is $1,585,200,” Dixon said. “Our final budget last year was $1,559,155, which is an increase of $26,000.”
Part of the increase is the number of protest hearings scheduled by taxpayers, she said. At present, the district has nearly 4,500 protest hearings scheduled, almost 500 more than last year.
For the entire county, the 2023 preliminary taxable value issued by the appraisal district in late April totaled $309.3 million, a $32.3 million increase in value from the previous year. From that increase, the appraisal district generated an additional $159,000 in revenue.
Devine’s pro rata share of that taxable value in 2024 is $22,801, an increase of $963 from 2023
“So, of that $159,000, we are asking for $936 more dollars” from Devine to fund the appraisal district in the coming year, Dixon said.
Ritchey used the opportunity to criticize the appraisal district process.
“From what I understand, the entire appraisal process is very opaque and any disagreement with the board is met with some rather subjective opinions and response. How can we drive through this process more transparency and more objective standards in the appraisal of properties?”
Dixon said the best way to challenge any appraisal is by using comparisons with other property nearby.
“If you can find comps in your neighborhood that’s what we do,” Dixon said. “We first look in the neighborhood. If we find comps we use those. We try to get as close to the subject as possible. From that point, if there aren’t any in that subdivision directly then we can expand out to the school district and we’ll try to find something as much like the property as possible.”
On a motion by Ritchey, seconded by Pyron, the council passed the budget increase for the appraisal district.
Aside from the property tax ordinance, Ritchey placed two other items on the council agenda – consider upgraded software for governmental budgeting and review options to ease bureaucratic challenges to local building contractors. Both items were tabled.
Under software, Ritchey asked the city staff to review a possible transition to ClearGov software designed to streamline the annual budgeting process by improving the collection, creation and communication of their budgets.
The item was tabled because the city is currently taking applications for a new city administrator. Interim City Administrator Dora Rodriguez advised that the applicants may have their own opinion on which software is best for the job.
On Ritchey’s request to make challenges to contractors easier he said that a “multitude” of contractors he has talked to refuse to work in Devine.
“Their explicit feedback is the city is too difficult to work with, requiring a lot of documentation and additional inspections over what they would expect in other places,” Ritchey said.
Mayor Cook also reported similar complaints from contractors he has dealt with. However, Ritchey nor Cook were ready with what Pyron referred to as “concrete examples.”
“We need some concrete examples rather than complaints like ‘I’m just annoyed that I have to fill out this paperwork,” Pyron said.
Rodriguez said the main reason contractors are required to fill out fresh paperwork about themselves for each project is to make sure their required licensing has not expired. It was noted by Randall that the city has not had a code compliance officer for nearly two years.
Ritchey countered that he did not necessarily want to bring immediate action before the council.
“I just want to start a conversation,” he said.

Lytle to host July 4th Annual Independence Day Celebration

This year the city will be partnering with the Lytle Chamber of Commerce for Lytle’s Annual Independence Day Celebration to make the event even better. The event will take place on July 4th at the John Lott Municipal Park. There will be food trucks set up along with live entertainment from both Chuck Wimer and Matthew Ryan.  
The music and food trucks will start at 5:00 pm and last till around 8:20 pm with fireworks being the Grand Finale. We invite everyone to come out and enjoy the evening with family and friends. Don’t forget the bring your lawn chairs and dancing boots.
If you don’t want to stay for the fireworks show feel free to visit the food trucks for a great dinner option and enjoy some live music.

Welcome, Billie Bell, New CEO of Medina Healthcare System

As one of Medina Healthcare’s most tenured executives, Billie helped advance the system’s growth strategy and clinical initiatives over the years.

Hondo, Texas, June 23, 2023 — Medina Healthcare System officially welcomes Billie Bell as their new Chief Executive Officer who began her new role on June 5th, 2023.
Billie Bell succeeds Janice Simons, who announced her retirement from the Healthcare System in March. Her appointment came after an extensive selection process by the board.
“The Board and I are confident that Billie Bell will continue with the advancements of Medina Healthcare System” Tim Hardt, President of the Medina County Hospital District Board of Directors, continued. “She is a seasoned leader with significant experience working as CNO and we are lucky to have her as our next CEO.”
Billie Bell has served as Medina Healthcare System’s Chief Nursing Officer for the past 7 years. In this role, Billie has focused on building exceptional teams and strategies to deliver high quality care. As one of Medina Healthcare’s most tenured executives, Billie helped advance the system’s growth strategy and clinical initiatives, through service line expansions, a commitment to exceptional patient care, and investments in healthcare technologies. Before joining Medina Healthcare System, Billie spent 2 years at Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas as a Senior Manager.
“I am honored to be chosen as the next Chief Executive Officer for Medina Healthcare System,” said Billie Bell. “By working together with my partners and colleagues, I am determined to use my role to build a stronger more cohesive healthcare system for our residents, families, and friends.”

Family transforms restaurant into a haircut hotspot

By Autumn Copeland
Hector and Felicia Garza are excited to introduce to you Hometown Cutz, a new full service barbershop located at 500 N Transportation Dr. in Devine. Their goal for their shop is to give people in the community a more affordable and caring option for men’s and boy’s haircuts and other services including waxes, hot towel shaves, beard trims, perms, and steamed facials.
Hector and Felicia are lifelong residents of Devine, high school sweethearts, and the parents of four boys- Xavier, Hector, Alonzo, and Ezekiel. Felicia worked in the food service industry at the Mexican restaurant Las Palmas from the time she was in high school until she was 32 years old. Hector worked in the oil field, but was never able to return to that line of work again after being in an accident and sustaining injuries to his arm and back.
During her time in quarantine with her family, Felicia realized she loved cutting her sons’ hair and was ready for a change in her work life. After getting the chance to go back to school, Felicia decided to attend a barber program and, with her husband’s patience and creativity, convinced him to go as well. The couple went to barber school for a year and bought the old Valdez Restaurant in November of 2022. Immediately they began to remodel the building, turning the old restaurant into a modern yet classic barbershop in six months.
“I just really want to be a big part of the community,” said Felicia. “I am for the customer. When you take care of your customers and care about your job, they take care of you in return.”
Being a mother of four boys, Felicia knows the struggles of getting haircuts with the steepening prices. She believes basic necessities such as haircuts should be affordable, so they offer child rates.
“Everybody who’s on a budget these days just can’t really afford it, so we really want to give them an affordable option,” said Felicia.
Another concern of Hector and Felicia’s is the accessibility of affordable haircuts for seniors. A 62 years and older senior citizen haircut costs $12 at the barbershop.
“What happened to the cut that went up from $8 to $12 to $15 that’s now at $35?” said Felicia. “We have senior citizen prices, we have kid prices, and regular haircut prices are affordable.
In the two weeks their barbershop has been open, Hector and Felicia have seen great support from the community. To show how much they appreciated customers giving them a chance, Hector and Felicia gave out 52 free haircuts during their first week of being open.
“If you go in with a good attitude and a positive mind, the positive outweighs the negative,” said Felicia. “Our doors are always open and we are ready to serve our community and welcome anybody.”
Hector and Felicia’s strong love of family and the bond they have with their hometown is shown through everything they do. It is truly a family business as you will often find their little helpers around the shop including their 16 year old Hector, who helps clean.
“What sets us apart is that we’re from here and we care,” said Felicia. “We care about the school, we care about the kids, we care about our community.”
Hometown Cutz is open from 8:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. Monday through Wednesday, 10:00 a.m.-8:00 p.m. Thursday and Friday, and 8:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m. on Saturdays.
See their weekly ad in the Devine News for more information.

Stefanie Maria Vera

Stefanie Maria Vera, age 68 of Devine, Texas entered eternal rest on Wednesday, June 21, 2023. She was born on November 28, 1954, to parents Domingo and Maria Hernandez Vera in Devine, Texas.
She is preceded in death by her parents, brothers Tim H. Vera, Vicente Vera, Jesus Vera, Esmeregildo Vera, Josesito Vera, Domingo Vera, Jr., sisters Lorenza Martinez, Cecilia Hernandez.
Stefanie is survived by her brother, Albino Vera, sisters Marcy Jay, Josephina Salinas, Miquelia Castillo, Romalda Vera, Lupe Moore, nephews and nieces, Anthony Vera, Joshua Vera, John Vera, John Moore, Gabriel Rene Vera, Alfonso Vera, Alvino Vera, Jr., Frankie Salinas, Lupe Vera, Vanessa Vera, Adela Moore, Connie Salinas, Mary Salinas, Elena Salinas.
Visitation will be held on Wednesday, June 28, 2023, 8:00 A.M. Primrose Funeral Services Chapel Devine, Texas. Rosary will be held on Wednesday, June 28, 2023, 9:00 A.M. with Mass to begin at 10:00 A.M. St. Joseph’s Catholic Church Devine, Texas with interment to follow at St. Joseph’s Catholic Church.
Anyone wishing to leave condolences, share memories, or sign the online guestbook may do so at www.primrosefuneralservices.com Arrangements are under the direction of Primrose Funeral Services, 303 W. College Ave., Devine, Texas, 78016, (830) 663-4445.

Jerry Gray Jones

Jerry Gray Jones was called to his eternal home June 26, 2023, fifty-six days after losing the love of his life, Lou Ann. Since her passing, he longed for the time that they would be together again. Jerry was born March 26, 1933 to Sam and Elsie Jones in San Antonio, TX. He graduated from Devine High School in 1950 and married Lou Ann Montgomery on May 29, 1955. They were married for almost 68 years and were blessed with four children.
After graduating high school, Jerry enlisted in the United State Air Force during the Korean War and served his country as a radar specialist from 1950 to 1954. After marrying Lou Ann, Jerry worked Civil Service and was later called into the ministry and pastored several churches throughout South Texas. As a pastor, Jerry enjoyed sharing the gospel with others at every opportunity. He was always available, day or night, whenever there was a need in the congregation or community.
Jerry loved deer hunting, traveling with Lou Ann and camping in their RV, spending time with the grandchildren, and family get togethers.
In 2018, Jerry and Lou Ann moved to Kingwood to live with their youngest daughter Betty and her husband Todd. He spent his final years there and enjoyed watching westerns on TV and spending time with 3 of his great grandchildren, Caleb, Hannah, and Molly. The family would like to express their gratitude to Susan Finley for giving up so much to care for both Jerry and Lou Ann and being a good friend to them. We are forever grateful for the loving care she gave them.
Jerry was preceded in death by his wife, Lou Ann, his parents, Sam and Elsie Jones, brothers Edwin Jones, Thomas Jones, and Romie Jones, sisters Cleo Wheeler, Shirley Johnson, and Cherry Jones. He is survived by his brother David Maurice Jones, sister-in-law Mildred Jones, children Johnny (Karen) Jones, Carol (Mike) Newbery, Kathy (Kirby) Haertner, Betty (Todd) Rogers, grandchildren, David (Natasha) Jones, Jessica (David) Bonnet, Joey (Leslie) Newberry, Jennifer (Jason) Moseley, Amanda (Ryan) Meegan, Emily (Justin) Robinson, Bradley (Stephanie) Rogers, and Erin Flowers, 14 great grandchildren and 3 great-great grandchildren.
A funeral service will be held at 10 AM on June 30th at Primrose Funeral Home in Devine, Texas. A visitation will be held preceding the funeral beginning at 8 AM. Interment will be at the Tomerlin Cemetery.